How to do an empirical study in finance?

Illustrated study:


The post-merger performance of acquiring firms: A Re-examination of an Anomoly (Agrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker)

by
Duong Nhu Hung
University of Economics and Law
4/2014

Agenda

- What is an empirical study?
- How to do a good empirical study?

Empirical research vs. Theorem



- Theorem: $X_1^2 + X_2^2 = Y^2$
- Empirical study:
 - $Y_i^2 = c + \beta_1 X_{1i}^2 + \beta_2 X_{2i}^2 + \epsilon$
 - Randomly generate 100 X1, X2, Y
 - Y_i are measured with random errors (0%, 1%, 10%)

Group: GROUP01 Workfile: UNTITLED::Untitled\



c	Object	Print	Name	Freeze	Defaul	t v	Sort	Transpos	e Edit+/-	Smpl-	+/- Title	Sample
	obs			X1		X2		Y0		Y1		Y10
	1		15.6	9929	24.9	94770	29	9.47635	29.7	7112	29.	47635
	2		91.3	1888	90.8	30589	1:	28.7822	128.	7822	11:	5.9040
	3		5.78	3199	17.2	27183	18	3.21432	18.0	3218	16.	39289
	4		96.6	6450	26.9	94556	10	00.3498	101.	3533	90.	31485
	5		95.9	5519	39.	15329	10	03.6358	104.	6722	103	3.6358
	6		39.0	9227	75.4	11982	84	4.94913	85.7	9863	84.	94913
	7		75.6	9197	13.3	35565	7	6.86123	76.0	9262	76.	86123
	8		87.9	4275	44.6	08006	98	8.60608	97.6	2002	108	8.4667
	9		68.4	1032	91.4	10696	1	14.1718	113.	0301	10:	2.7546
	10		74.7	8645	91.8	36540	1	18.4579	118.	4579	118	8.4579
	11		16.0	9635	40.0	9437	4	3.20476	43.6	3681	43.	20476
	12		25.4	3259	71.5	57404	7	5.95828	75.1	9869	83.	55410
	13		25.9	8451	55.2	24961	6	1.05501	61.6	6556	54.	94951
	14		71.0	7335	0.66	55685	7	1.07647	71.7	8723	71.	07647
	15		54.9	4317	21.2	23934	58	8.90553	58.3	1648	58.	90553

0% error

$$Y_i^2 = c + \beta_1^* X_{1i}^2 + \beta_2^* X_{2i}^2 + \varepsilon$$



Dependent Variable: Y0^2 Method: Least Squares

Date: 04/10/14 Time: 12:05

Sample: 1 100

Included observations: 100

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.	
С	1.46E-12	2.97E-13	4.893587	0.0000	
X1^2	1.000000	5.34E-17	1.87E+16	0.0000	
X2^2	1.000000	4.77E-17	2.10E+16	0.0000	
R-squared	1.000000	Mean dependent var		7466.983	
Adjusted R-squared	1.000000	S.D. depende	4423.340		
S.E. of regression	1.51E-12	Akaike info cri	-51.57277		
Sum squared resid	2.21E-22	Schwarz criter	-51.49462		
Log likelihood	2581.639	Hannan-Quinn criter.		-51.54114	
F-statistic	4.26E+32	Durbin-Watson stat		1.916247	
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000				

1% error

$$Y_i^2 = c + \beta_1^* X_{1i}^2 + \beta_2^* X_{2i}^2 + \varepsilon$$

Equation: EQ04				
lew Proc Object Print	Ivalie Teeze	LSullate I of eca.	St Stats Resid	3
Dependent Variable: Y	1^2			
Method: Least Squares				
Date: 04/10/14 Time:	12:02			
Sample: 1 100				
Included observations:	100			
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
С	-21.72878	25.22336	-0.861455	0.3911
X1^2	1.004652	0.004530	221.7940	0.0000
X2^2	0.999939	0.004048	247.0469	0.0000
R-squared	0.999184	Mean depend	ient var	7461.466
Adjusted R-squared	0.999168	S.D. depende	4434.225	
S.E. of regression	127,9302	Akaike info cr	12.57039	
S.E. Ul regression				

Hannan-Quinn criter.

Durbin-Watson stat

-625.5194

59421.04

0.000000

Log likelihood

Prob(F-statistic)


F-statistic

12.60202

1.787688

10% error

$$Y_i^2 = c + \beta_1^* X_{1i}^2 + \beta_2^* X_{2i}^2 + \epsilon$$



Misspecified model

$$Y_i = c + \beta_1 * X_{1i} + \beta_2 * X_{2i} + \epsilon$$

	Wedeler III			
☐ Equation: EQ01		1		
iew Proc Object Print	Name Freeze	Estimate Foreca	st Stats Resid	s
Dependent Variable: Y0)			
Method: Least Squares				
Date: 04/10/14 Time:	12:00			
Sample: 1 100				
Included observations:	100			
Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
С	8.144768	1.479501	5.505077	0.0000
X1	0.682197	0.019594	34.81678	0.0000
X2	0.668916	0.018104	36.94828	0.0000
	0.000010	0.010104	00.01020	0.0000
R-squared	0.966818	Mean depend	3 (8)	81.76930
The state of the s		V 5/851 85	dent var	ENGINEER STREET
R-squared Adjusted R-squared S.E. of regression	0.966818	Mean depend	dent var ent var	81.76930

Hannan-Quinn criter.

Durbin-Watson stat

6.184036

2.181348

-304.6202

1413.133

0.000000


Log likelihood

Prob(F-statistic)

F-statistic

Misspecified model

$$Y_i = c + \beta_1 * X_{1i} + \beta_2 * X_{2i} + \epsilon$$



Empirical research (wiki)


- Empirical research = observable data + formulate hypotheses + test theories → conclusions
 - the outcome of empirical research is never proof. It can only support a hypothesis, reject it, or do neither
 - empirical evidence refers to objective evidence that appears the same regardless of the observer
 - Temperature: 20oC vs. Cool
 - Statistical formulas such as regression, t-test, chi square, and various types of ANOVA (analyses of variance) are fundamental in empirical research

Requirements for a good empirical study

- Significant objectives
- Good methodology
 - Good model (well specified)
 - Good measures of data (reliable measurements)
- Reliable data
- Solid tests

empirical cycle

- A.D. De Groot's empirical cycle:
 - Observation: The collecting and organization of empirical facts; Forming hypothesis.
 - Induction: Formulating hypothesis.
 - Deduction: Deducting consequences of hypothesis as testable predictions.
 - Testing: Testing the hypothesis with new empirical material.
 - Evaluation: Evaluating the outcome of testing



How to start a good study?

- With the good studies in the past!
 - Journal reputation
 - Author reputation

Top Ten Journals Finance Based on ISI Impact Factors

- Journal of Finance: American Finance Association (Rank #1, 2008 ISI)
- Journal of Financial Economics: University of Rochester (NY) (Rank #2, 2008 ISI)
- Journal of Accounting and Economics: Elsevier (Rank #3, 2008 ISI).
- Review of Financial Studies: Oxford University Press (Rank #4, 2008 ISI)
- Journal of Accounting Research: Wiley-Blackwell (Rank #5, 2008 ISI)
- The Accounting Review: American Accounting Association (Rank #6, 2008 ISI)
- World Bank Economic Review: Oxford University Press (Rank #7, 2008 ISI)
- Accounting, Organizations, and Society: Elsevier (Rank #8, 2008 ISI)
- Journal of Corporate Finance: Elsevier (Rank #9, 2008 ISI)
- Review of Accounting Studies: Springer (Rank #10, 2008 ISI)

Top Five Journals in Economics Based on ISI Impact Factors

- Journal of Economic Literature (JEL): American Economic Association (AEA) -- (Rank #1, 2009 ISI)
- Quarterly Journal of Economics: Oxford University Press -- (Rank #2, 2009 ISI)
- Journal of Financial Economics (JFE): University of Rochester (NY) -- (Rank #3, 2009 ISI)
- Econometrica: The Econometric Society -- (Rank #4, 2009 ISI)
- Journal of Economic Geography: Oxford University Press -- (Rank #5, 2009 ISI)

Step 1: Idenification of a research area

Areas:


- Performance of M&A
- Performance of IPOs

__ ...

Step 2: Literature Review

- http://scholar.google.com or Google.com
- www.ssrn.com
- Subsribed journals
 - Jstor, Elsevier,...

Sample searched



Introduction sample

 ... takeover activity comes in waves and that announcement-day returns are significantly positive for target shareholders while bidder shareholders returns vary depending on the mode of acquisition, method of payment and type of target. Moreover, post-acquisition returns to acquiring shareholders are higher for cash offers and tender offers than for stock offers and mergers (Christa Bouwman, Kathleen Fuller, **Amrita Nain)**

Reference

References

- Agrawal, A., J. Jaffe, G.N. Mandelker, 1992, The post-merger performance of acquiring firms:

 A reexamination of an anomaly, *Journal of Finance 47, 1605-1621*.
- Andrade, G., M. Mitchell and E. Stafford, 2001, New evidence and perspectives on mergers, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103-120
- Asquith, P., 1983, Merger bids, market uncertainty, and stockholder returns, *Journal of Financial Economics* 11, 51-83.
- Asquith, P., and D. Mullins, 1986, Equity issues and offering dilution, *Journal of Financial Economics* 15, 61-89.
- Baker, M., and J. Wurgler, 2002, Market timing and capital structure, *Journal of Finance 57, 1-25.*

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. XLVII, NO. 4 • SEPTEMBER 1992

The Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly

ANUP AGRAWAL, JEFFREY F. JAFFE, AND GERSHON N.
MANDELKER

Step 3: Research gap identification

mergers. Some conclude that these firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns over one to three years after the merger (for example, Langetieg (1978), Asquith (1983), and Magenheim and Mueller (1988)). These findings led Jensen and Ruback (1983, p. 20) to remark: "These post-outcome negative abnormal returns are unsettling because they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that changes in stock prices during takeovers overestimate the future efficiency gains from mergers." Ruback (1988, p. 262)

Vs.

However, a conclusion of underperformance is not clearly warranted based on prior research. First, the results are not all one-sided. Langetieg (1978) finds that post-merger abnormal performance is not significantly different

underperformance in the three years following acquisitions. Recently, using a multifactor benchmark, Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) also do not find significant underperformance over three years after the acquisition.

Research gap cont.

Furthermore, recent studies typically examined post-merger returns as part of a larger study focusing on announcement period returns. Hence, they generally do not provide thorough analyses of the long-run performance of acquirers. In particular, one problem with prior studies is that they do not properly adjust for the firm size effect. Evidence in <u>Dimson and Marsh (1986)</u> suggests that an adjustment for firm size is important in studies of long-run performance. This adjustment is likely to be particularly important in a study of mergers since acquirers are usually large firms. In addition, none of the previous studies allows for month-to-month shifts in beta. The resulting bias can be significant when abnormal returns are cumulated over a long period.

Implications

A finding of underperformance has three important implications. First, the concept of efficient capital markets is a major paradigm in finance. Systematically poor performance after mergers is, of course, inconsistent with this paradigm. Second, much research on mergers examines returns surrounding

Step 4: Research objective

The purpose of this paper is to provide a thorough analysis of the postmerger performance of acquiring firms. We present evidence on two issues. First, after adjusting for the firm size effect as well as beta risk, our results indicate that stockholders of acquiring firms experience a statistically significant wealth loss of about 10% over five years after the merger completion date. This finding is based on a nearly exhaustive sample of mergers over 1955 to 1987 between NYSE acquirers and NYSE/AMEX targets. The result is robust to a variety of specifications and does not seem to be caused by changes in beta. Second, we test whether the market is slow to adjust to the merger event. Under this hypothesis, the long-run performance would reflect

Step 5: Data collection

Our database of mergers and tender offers was obtained by a two-step process.² First, a list of all the firms that disappeared from the files of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) over the interval from January 1955 to December 1987 was prepared. Second, the Wall Street Journal Index was consulted to determine which of these firms disappeared due to tender offers or mergers. An event was classified as a tender offer if the acquiring firm purchased at least 60 percent of the target firm's shares by tender offer and later bought the remaining shares through a clean-up merger. The sample consists of 937 mergers and 227 tender offers.³ This represents nearly the entire population of acquisitions of NYSE and AMEX firms by NYSE firms over the period 1955 to 1987.⁴

Step 6: Good methodology How to measure the performance?

- Calculate returns surrounding events
 - Abnormal return (AR)= Actual returns
 Benchmark returns
 - Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) = sum of AR
- Benchmark returns
 - CAPM: Rb= Rf+ beta*(Rm- Rf)
 - Dimson and Marsh (1986): the mesured performance is influenced by size

Research methodology

We employ two alternative methodologies, each of which adjusts for both beta risk and market capitalization. For both methods, we form the following set of size control groups. At the end of each calendar year, all stocks on the NYSE are ranked according to their market capitalization and allocated to 10 decile portfolios. For each month over the following year, the return on each decile portfolio is computed as the equally weighted average return across all securities in the portfolio. 8

Improved methodology

Dimson and Marsh (1986):

- $Eit=Rit - Rst - (\beta i - \beta s)*(Rm-Rf)$

 R_{st} = the equally weighted average return during month t on the control portfolio of all firms in the same size decile as firm i, based on the market value of equity at the end of the previous year.¹⁰

 β_i = the beta of security *i*. We estimate β_i using monthly data over the period from month +1 to month +60 after the merger completion.^{11,12}

 β_s = the beta of the control group. We estimate β_s over months +1 to +60 relative to the completion month.

 R_{mt} = the return on the market index. We report results using the NYSE value-weighted index. Results are similar with the NYSE equally weighted index.

 R_{ft} = the risk-free rate in month t, as measured by the yield on a one-month Treasury bill.

Average AR & CAAR

The average abnormal return (AAR) over all stocks in month t is:

$$AAR_t = \frac{1}{N_t} \sum_{i=1}^{N_t} \epsilon_{it},$$

where N_t is the number of securities in the sample with a return in event month t. The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) from event month t_1 to t_2 is:

$$CAAR_{t_1}^{t_2} = \sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2} AAR_t$$

Table I

Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms After Adjustment for Firm Size and Beta Risk

The abnormal return for firm i in month t is computed as in (1):

$$\epsilon_{it} = R_{it} - R_{st} - (\beta_i - \beta_s)(R_{mt} - R_{ft}),$$

Months After Merger Completion	Average Abnormal Return (AAR)	Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR)	Percent of Positive CARs (%)	
1-12	-1.53% (-0.98)	-1.53% (-0.98)	46.56% (-1.90)	
13-24	-3.41 $(-2.00)^{b}$	-4.94 $(-2.10)^{b}$	47.67 (-1.26)	
25-36	-2.44 (-1.73)	-7.38 $(-2.72)^a$	46.39 (-1.91)	
37-48	-1.29 (-0.54)	-8.67 $(-2.62)^{a}$	44.98 $(-2.61)^a$	
49-60	-1.59 (-0.07)	-10.26 $(-2.37)^{b}$	43.97 $(-3.03)^a$	

a, b Statistical significance in 2-tailed tests at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

Step 7: test test test (robustness test)

Table II
Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms Over Different Decades

Months	Mergers Completed During									
After Merger	1955-59 (N = 51)		1960-69 (N = 299)		1970-79 (N = 247)		1980–87 ($N = 168$)		1975-84 (N = 290)	
Completion	AAR	CAAR	AAR	CAAR	AAR	CAAR	AAR	CAAR	AAR	CAAR
1-12	-2.4% (-0.86)	-2.4% (-0.86)	-1.8% (-0.56)	-1.8% (-0.56)	0.0% (-0.42)	0.0% (-0.42)	-2.8% (-0.73)	-2.8% (-0.73)	-0.9% (-0.30)	-0.9% (-0.30)
13-24	-4.0 (-1.06)	-6.4 (-1.36)	-4.1 (-1.14)	-5.9 (-1.21)	0.7 (0.55)	0.7 (0.09)	-7.6 $(-3.53)^a$	-10.4 $(-3.02)^a$	-3.4 (-1.50)	-4.2 (-1.27)
25-36	-5.0 (-2.09) ^b	-11.4 $(-2.32)^{b}$	-4.4 (-1.79)	-10.3 $(-2.02)^{b}$	0.1 (0.07)	0.8 (0.11)	-2.0 (-1.12)	-12.4 $(-3.11)^a$	0.3 (-0.07)	-4.0 (-1.07)
37-48	-7.3 $(-2.66)^a$	-18.7 $(-3.34)^{a}$	-2.0 (-1.07)	-12.3 $(-2.28)^{b}$	0.8 (0.91)	1.6 (0.55)	-1.4 (0.36)	-13.8 $(-2.51)^{b}$	1.0 (1.66)	-3.0 (-0.10)
49-60	-4.5 (-0.94)	-23.2 $(-3.41)^{a}$	-2.8 (-1.07)	-15.1 $(-2.52)^{b}$	2.5 (2.03) ^b	4.1 (1.40)	-5.6 (-1.17)	-19.4 $(-2.77)^{a}$	0.2 (1.50)	-2.8 (-0.58)

The last two columns of Table II show the post-merger performance over the 1975–1984 time period of the recent paper by Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991). We find no abnormal performance during this time period, a result consistent with that of Franks, Harris, and Titman. A breakdown (not reported) of our 33-year sample period into five-year subperiods (1955 to 1959, 1960 to 1964, etc.) shows that 1975 to 1979 is the only five-year period when the post-merger performance is significantly positive. This period constitutes one half of Franks, Harris, and Titman's sample. Over the remainder of their sample period, 1980 to 1984, the post-merger performance is significantly negative. Thus, the performance over the combined period, 1975 to 1984, is insignificant. We conclude that Franks, Harris, and Titman's results are specific to their sample period.

Table III

Post-Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms in Conglomerate and Non-Conglomerate Mergers

Months After Merger	Conglomera	tes(N = 686)	Non-Conglomerates ($N = 79$)			
Completion	AAR	CAAR	AAR	CAAR		
1-12	-1.5% (-0.92)	-1.5% (-0.92)	-1.5% (-0.42)	-1.5% (-0.42)		
13-24	$-2.9 \\ (-1.63)$	-4.4 (-1.80)	$-8.0 (-2.01)^{b}$	-9.5 (-1.71)		
25-36	$-1.9 \\ (-1.21)$	$-6.3 (-2.17)^{b}$	-7.7 $(-2.91)^{a}$	-17.2 $(-3.08)^{a}$		
37-48	-1.3 (-0.52)	-7.6 $(-2.13)^{b}$	-1.2 (-0.17)	-18.4 $(-2.75)^{a}$		
49-60	-1.0 (-0.20)	-8.6 (-1.82)	-7.1 (-1.51)	-25.5 $(-3.14)^{a}$		

a, b Statistical significance in 2-tailed tests at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

Conclusion

with an adjustment for firm size. We find that stockholders of the acquiring firms suffer a statistically significant wealth loss of about 10% over the five years following the merger completion. This finding is robust to a variety of specifications and does not seem to be caused by changes in beta following the merger. Therefore, we conclude that the efficient-market anomaly of negative post-merger performance highlighted in Jensen and Ruback (1983) is not resolved. This conclusion runs contrary to Franks, Harris, and Titman's (1991) results which, as we show, are specific to their sample time period and are also due to their mixing of tender offers with mergers.

How to do a joint research?

You:

- Literature reviews
- Development of Hypothesis/ research model

CEFR can help:

- Collect relevant data
- Help you analyze the data/ test the model

Both

- Interprete the findings
- Principles: share work + share costs